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Cover
story
Excerpts: summary of report on Guatemalas civil
war
Tragedy of armed confontation
With the outbreak of the internal armed confrontation in 1962,
Guatemala entered a tragic and devastating stage of its history with enormous
human, material and moral cost. In the documentation of human rights violations
and acts of violence connected with the armed confrontation, the Commission for
Historical Clarification (CEH) registered a total of 42,275 victims, including
men, women and children. Of these, 23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution,
and 6,159 were victims of forced disappearance. Eighty-three percent of fully
identified victims were Mayan, and 17 percent were Ladino.
Combining this data with the results of other studies of political
violence in Guatemala, the CEH estimates that the number of persons killed or
disappeared as a result of the fratricidal confrontation reached a total of
more than 200,000.
Historical roots
The Commission for Historical Clarification concludes that the
structure and nature of economic, cultural and social relations in Guatemala
are marked by profound exclusion, antagonism and conflict -- a reflection of
its colonial history. The proclamation of independence in 1821, an event
prompted by the countrys elite, saw the creation of an authoritarian
state that excluded the majority of the population, was racist in its precepts
and practices, and served to protect the economic interests of the privileged
minority. ...
The Cold War; role of the United
States
The CEH recognizes that the movement of Guatemala toward
polarization, militarization and civil war was not just the result of national
history. The Cold War also played an important role. While anti-communism,
promoted by the United States within the framework of its foreign policy,
received firm support from right-wing political parties and from various other
powerful actors in Guatemala, the United States demonstrated that it was
willing to provide support for strong military regimes in its strategic
backyard. In the case of Guatemala, military assistance was directed toward
reinforcing the national intelligence apparatus and for training the officer
corps in counterinsurgency techniques, key factors that had significant bearing
on human rights violations during the armed confrontation.
Anti-communism and the National Security Doctrine (DSN) formed
part of the anti-Soviet strategy of the United States in Latin America. In
Guatemala, these were first expressed as anti-reformist, then antidemocratic
policies, culminating in criminal counterinsurgency. The National Security
Doctrine fell on fertile ground in Guatemala where anti-communist thinking had
already taken root and from the 1930s had merged with the defense of religion,
tradition and conservative values, all of which were allegedly threatened by
the worldwide expansion of atheistic communism. Until the 1950s, these views
were strongly supported by the Catholic church, which qualified as communist
any position that contradicted its philosophy, thus contributing even further
to division and confusion in Guatemalan society.
The internal enemy
During the armed confrontation, the States idea of the
internal enemy, intrinsic to the National Security Doctrine, became
increasingly inclusive. At the same time, this doctrine became the raison
dêtre of army and State policies for several decades. Through its
investigation, the CEH discovered one of the most devastating effects of this
policy: state forces and related paramilitary groups were responsible for 93
percent of the violations documented by the CEH, including 92 percent of the
arbitrary executions and 91 percent of forced disappearances. Victims included
men, women and children of all social strata: workers, professionals, church
members, politicians, peasants, students and academics; in ethnic terms, the
vast majority were Mayans.
The Catholic church
Only recently in Guatemalan history and within a short time period
did the Catholic church abandon its conservative position in favor of an
attitude and practice based on the decisions of the Second Vatican Council
(1962-1965) and the Episcopal Conference of Medellín (1968),
prioritizing its work with excluded, poor and underprivileged sectors and
promoting the construction of a more just and equitable society. These
doctrinal and pastoral changes clashed with counterinsurgency strategy, which
considered Catholics to be allies of the guerrillas and therefore part of the
internal enemy, subject to persecution, death or expulsion. Whereas the
guerrilla movement saw in the practice of what was known as liberation
theology common ground on which to extend its social base, seeking to
gain the sympathy of its followers. A large number of catechists, lay
activists, priests and missionaries were victims of the violence and gave their
lives as a testimony to the cruelty of the armed confrontation.
A disproportionate response
The magnitude of the States repressive response, totally
disproportionate to the military force of the insurgency, can only be
understood within the framework of the countrys profound social, economic
and cultural conflicts. Based on the results of its investigation, the CEH
concludes that from 1978 to 1982 citizens from broad sectors of society
participated in growing social mobilization and political opposition to the
continuity of the countrys established order. These movements in some
cases maintained ties of a varying nature with the insurgency. However, at no
time during the internal armed confrontation did the guerrilla groups have the
military potential necessary to pose an imminent threat to the State. The
number of insurgent combatants was too small to be able to compete in the
military arena with the Guatemalan army, which had more troops and superior
weaponry, as well as better training and coordination. It has also been
confirmed that during the armed confrontation, the State and the army had
knowledge of the level of organization, the number of combatants, the type of
weaponry and the strategy of the insurgent groups. They were therefore well
aware that the insurgents military capacity did not represent a real
threat to Guatemalas political order.
The CEH concludes that the State deliberately magnified the
military threat of the insurgency, a practice justified by the concept of the
internal enemy. The inclusion of all opponents under one banner, democratic or
otherwise, pacifist or guerrilla, legal or illegal, communist or non-communist,
served to justify numerous and serious crimes. Faced with widespread political,
socioeconomic and cultural opposition, the State resorted to military
operations directed toward the physical annihilation or absolute intimidation
of this opposition, through a plan of repression carried out mainly by the army
and national security forces.
The CEH has confirmed with particular concern that a large number
of children were also among the direct victims of arbitrary execution, forced
disappearance, torture, rape and other violations of their fundamental rights.
Moreover, the armed confrontation left a large number of children orphaned and
abandoned, especially among the Mayan population, who saw their families
destroyed and the possibility of living a normal childhood within the norms of
their culture lost.
Women
The CEHs investigation has revealed that approximately a
quarter of the direct victims of human rights violations and acts of violence
were women. They were killed, tortured and raped, sometimes because of their
ideals and political or social participation, sometimes in massacres or other
indiscriminate actions. Thousands of women lost their husbands, becoming widows
and the sole breadwinners for their children, often with no material resources
after the scorched earth policies resulted in the destruction of their homes
and crops. Their efforts to reconstruct their lives and support their families
deserve special recognition.
The Kaibiles
The substantiation of the degrading contents of the training of
the armys special counterinsurgency force, known as Kaibiles, has drawn
the particular attention of the CEH. This training included killing animals and
then eating them raw and drinking their blood in order to demonstrate courage.
The extreme cruelty of these training methods, according to testimony available
to the CEH, was then put into practice in a range of operations carried out by
these troops, confirming one point of their decalogue: The Kaibil is a
killing machine.
Forced complicity in the violence
The CEH counts among the most damaging effects of the
confrontation those that resulted from forcing large sectors of the population
to be accomplices in the violence, especially through their participation in
the Civil Patrols (PAC), the paramilitary structures created by the army in
1981 in most of the republic. The CEH is aware of hundreds of cases in which
civilians were forced by the army, at gun point, to rape women, torture,
mutilate corpses and kill. ...
The CEH has noted particularly serious cruelty in many acts
committed by agents of the State, especially members of the army, in their
operations against Mayan communities. The counterinsurgency strategy not only
led to violations of basic human rights, but also to the fact that these crimes
were committed with particular cruelty, with massacres representing their
archetypal form. In the majority of massacres there is evidence of multiple
acts of savagery, which preceded, accompanied or occurred after the deaths of
the victims. Acts such as the killing of defenseless children, often by beating
them against walls or throwing them alive into pits where the corpses of adults
were later thrown; the amputation of limbs; the impaling of victims; the
killing of persons by covering them in petrol and burning them alive; the
extraction, in the presence of others, of the viscera of victims who were still
alive; the confinement of people who had been mortally tortured, in agony for
days; the opening of the wombs of pregnant women, and other similarly atrocious
acts, were not only actions of extreme cruelty against the victims, but also
morally degraded the perpetrators and those who inspired, ordered or tolerated
these actions.
The responsibility for a large part of these violations, with
respect to the chain of military command as well as the political and
administrative responsibility, reaches the highest levels of the army and
successive governments.
The excuse that lower ranking army commanders were acting with a
wide margin of autonomy and decentralization without orders from superiors, as
a way of explaining that excesses and errors were
committed, is an unsubstantiated argument according to the CEHs
investigation. The notorious fact that no high-commander, officer or person in
the midlevel command of the army or state security forces was tried or
convicted for violation of human rights during all these years reinforces the
evidence that the majority of these violations were the result of an
institutional policy, thereby ensuring impenetrable impunity, which persisted
during the whole period investigated by the CEH.
Acts of genocide
The legal framework adopted by the CEH to analyze the possibility
that acts of genocide were committed in Guatemala during the internal armed
confrontation is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on Dec. 9, 1948 and
ratified by the Guatemalan State by Decree 704 on Nov. 30, 1949.
In consequence, the CEH concludes that agents of the State of
Guatemala, within the framework of counterinsurgency operations carried out
between 1981 and 1983, committed acts of genocide against groups of Mayan
people that lived in the four regions analyzed. This conclusion is based on the
evidence that, in light of Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the killing of members of Mayan groups
occurred ... serious bodily or mental harm was inflicted and the group was
deliberately subjected to living conditions calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part. The conclusion is also based on the
evidence that all these acts were committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part groups identified by their common ethnicity, by reason
thereof, whatever the cause, motive or final objective of these acts may have
been.
National Catholic Reporter, March 12,
1999
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