Analysis Battling for the militarys future
By Thomas A. Cardamone
Jr. Special to the National Catholic Reporter
The competing factions have defined their objectives and are
positioning themselves for the impending clash ahead. Some of the worlds
finest military minds are planning for a battle whose outcome is far from
apparent. No less than the nations security is at stake. The potential
casualties, at this juncture, are incalculable.
The narrative above is not a newspaper report from some turbulent
developing nation. Nor is it the beginning of a new Tom Clancy thriller.
Rather, it describes the brewing battles that are taking shape in the corridors
of the Pentagon.
Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with numerous
unpredictable and violent events in the intervening years acting as a catalyst,
U.S. military strategists have begun to contemplate what the likely opponent of
the future will be. And, as a consequence, the theorists are trying to discern
what types of weapons will be needed to dominate that opponent.
As might be expected of an institution that has a $268 billion
budget and a civilian and active military work force of about 2 million, change
will not come quickly or cheaply. Entrenched bureaucracies and competing
opinions about the very nature of the future threat will prevent any rapid
change in force structure.
However, changes in the militarys structure, some say, are
vital to the nations future security. Decisions made in the next few
years could have a far-reaching effect on the types of foreign operations the
military can undertake and the funding levels the taxpayer will be required to
allocate toward the Pentagon.
Tactics and technology
The task at hand is formidable. During World War I it took the
European armies years to adjust their tactics to early 20th-century technology
-- primarily the machine gun. Millions died when, using mid 19th-century
tactics, continuous waves of human flesh charged well-hidden guns that fired a
torrent of singeing metal. In World War II, Frances static Maginot Line
became a new symbol of laughably outdated tactics. The Nazi blitzkrieg simply
out-flanked the French defenses and took Paris in short order. However, despite
these tactical lags, the general concept of waging war had not changed a great
deal in the previous 100 years -- that is, massive armies would move across
national borders in order to take and hold new territory.
Todays Pentagon cant simply adjust its tactics to keep
pace with technology because war fighting isnt as clear-cut as in the
past. In the last decade American military personnel have been involved in
several distinctly different types of operations. From the desert battles of
the Gulf War, street-to-street fighting in Mogadishu, Somalia, peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia, to the air campaign over Serbia, U.S. forces have had to
rely on myriad capabilities, including heavy armor and high-tech fighter planes
as well as the training and discipline of ground troops under fire.
And although the United States is at the forefront of
technological advances in military equipment, defense planners face a doubly
difficult quandary. They must try to anticipate what types of wars are likely
to be fought in the new century and then decide which of the currently
available technologies can be used and updated, which must be jettisoned and
which of those on the drawing board should be funded.
So while the Pentagon has the wealth to build the equipment it
needs, the equipment it needs could very well be dictated by the whims of a
Somali clan leader. According to Andrew Krepinevich, executive director of the
Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, The
principal challenge to our security isnt fiscal, its
strategic. Simply spending more money wont help,
Krepinevich said. Rather, the question is: Are we building the right kind of
force?
Moreover, according to a report released in September 1999 by a
special commission mandated by the secretary of defense, the threats could
evolve still further over the next 10 years. Among the 14 conclusions listed by
the reports authors (including a team of analysts led by former Sens.
Gary Hart and Warren Rudman), several make the case for creating a military
force with a new outlook. The study, called New World Coming: American
Security in the 21st Century, noted:
- America will become increasingly vulnerable to [a]
hostile attack on our homeland;
- Proliferation of new technologies will create new
vulnerabilities for U.S. security;
- Excellent intelligence [gathering ability] will not
prevent all surprises.
As if to underline the seriousness of their endeavor, the authors
said, The essence of war will not change. They say that in the
future war will not be like a video game, and they make the
chilling prediction that some future conflicts could include levels of
violence shocking to our sensibilities.
The three scenarios
Although the Cold War is long over, thus far the Pentagon has
lived up to the old maxim that armies prepare to fight the last war.
Specifically, the Defense Department continues to purchase and design expensive
weaponry to fight great land and sea battles. Indeed, the Air Forces $64
billion F-22 fighter program, the Navys $60 billion New Attack submarine
fleet and the Armys plan to spend $22 billion for a massive 110-ton
Crusader howitzer are all glaring examples of equipment needed to fight an
opponent like the former Soviet Union.
This approach represents a stay the course plan. The
basic thinking is that the United States has the best-trained and best-equipped
military in the world, so theres no great impetus to create a massive
upheaval to change the way business has been done for decades. Surely the
United States will continue to be at the forefront of technological
development, but a substantial shift in strategy isnt likely in the near
term. This philosophy, of course, ignores the conclusions of the New
World Coming report, which suggests, the mix and effectiveness of
overall American capabilities need to be rethought and adjusted.
While there would be little structural upheaval at the Pentagon if
the status quo is maintained, the cost considerations could still be
substantial. Some analysts believe that by 2005, when many of the new weapon
systems enter service, defense costs could rise $30 to $40 billion per year
above the current $268 billion to cover production costs. And at a time when
some Capitol Hill lawmakers, such as Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Calif.), begin
attacking production funds for the F-22 due to performance concerns, as
happened last September, it is unclear if legislators would permit such a steep
increase.
A second option would speed up the pace and scope of new
technologies being incorporated into the military but essentially assumes that
future threats wont radically change. This concept, dubbed even
more of the same by defense analyst John Pike at the Federation of
American Scientists in Washington, would create a more efficient airlift
capability to get its heavy equipment to the battlefield more quickly. This
would help to counter criticisms levied during the Kosovo crisis where it took
weeks to get Apache helicopters to the theater of operations.
An example of this type of capability was outlined in an October
speech by Gen. Eric Shinseki, chief of staff of the Army, who said that by
using strategic mobility, his goal would be the ability to
transport 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers and their equipment anywhere in the world
in just five days. When compared to the time it took to get troops to the gulf
during Desert Shield in 1991, such a transport rate is a tremendously difficult
task.
Shinseki also noted he wants to transform the Army to
create a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full
spectrum of operations. Specifically, he wants to maintain the current
mix of heavy divisions, which contain tanks and other large firepower, and
light divisions comprised of more mobile infantry troops. While the general
noted that by using new technology and strategy these divisions would be more
effective than they are today, the basic assumption is that the types of
weaponry will not change.
But, if you do that youll build the wrong kind of
force, according to Krepinevich. The proliferation of missile
technologies, he said, will render heavy tanks and other equipment vulnerable
at the point of entry. Youll be moving equipment more quickly into
an ambush -- itll be like Omaha Beach, Krepinevich said.
The other downside is the cost: Some analysts say the Pentagon
would need to add $100 billion per year to the budget to achieve such a rapid
increase in equipment and mobility -- an amount of money which, in the current
climate, is politically untenable.
A third option, advocated by Krepinevich, would not just add
technology but change the way it works -- prepare for different sorts of
threats. Over the next 10 years security challenges will change, he and
others believe. They are likely to include not only conventional opponents but
also unconventional or asymmetrical threats such as electronic
warfare and chemical and biological weapons proliferation.
A mobile force
Among the ideas put forth to defend against these threats is the
development of a more mobile, long-range force. For example, the number of
aircraft carrier battle groups could be reduced to 10 from the current 12. In
their place would be smaller ships that fire Tomahawk missiles with a range of
1,000 miles. This approach would keep pilots out of harms way while
maintaining a deep-strike force capability with a fraction of the personnel.
Adherents to such a plan believe these types of adjustments would add just $5
to $10 billion to the Pentagon budget.
Others however, are not so sure there is fertile ground at the
Defense Department for such a radical departure from current practices. Pike of
the Federation of American Scientists said that since the current force is
so substantial, there is no incentive for innovation. As an
example, Pike noted that a concept to build an arsenal ship for the
Navy, which would be a floating missile launch system with 500 missiles on
board and a crew of just 50 sailors, was squashed as too revolutionary.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the next president will have to
make some tough decisions about the form and function of the national security
structure early in his first term. According to the New World
Coming study, the stakes are rising. The evidence suggests,
the report noted, that threats to American security will be more diffuse,
harder to anticipate, and more difficult to neutralize than ever before.
Further, despite a dynamic economy, the governments pot of money is not
limitless. In that light, the next election takes on an added importance.
Thomas Cardamone is a project director at the Council For A
Livable World Education Fund in Washington.
National Catholic Reporter, January 28,
2000
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