Professor pitches hard-line sanctions policy
toward Iraq
By CLAIRE
SCHAEFFER-DUFFY Special to the National Catholic Reporter
While Washington reconsiders its strategy for Iraq, Michael Rubin,
professor of history and visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, is pitching a hard-line agenda to the American public and
policymakers alike: Retain sanctions. Contain or remove Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein.
Opponents of sanctions say Rubins analysis has obscured the
complexities of the Iraq picture and the source of Iraqi suffering. Propelling
their debate is the question, What direction will the United States take
in Iraq?
Since his return from Iraqi Kurdistan in mid-June, Rubin has
argued against softening sanctions in a radio interview and two articles
published in the New Republic.
The Yale lecturer, whose area of expertise is 19th-century Iranian
reform literature, spent nine months teaching in the three northern governates
of Iraq. That region, he observed, is experiencing sanctions very differently
from the southern and central parts of the country. The infant mortality rate
has dropped below pre-war levels. Unemployment remains high, but the
stores and pharmacies are well-stocked. Even Haagen-Dazs ice cream is
available. The key point, he notes, is that it is the same
sanctions administered throughout every part of Iraq.
Rubin, who did not visit southern and central Iraq, argues that
discrepancies between the two regions can be attributed to a single variable --
the Hussein regime. In the North, the United Nations oversees implementation of
the Oil for Food program, but in southern and central Iraq the program is
administered by the Iraqi government.
Initiated in December 1996, Oil for Food allows Iraq to export oil
and use a portion of that income to buy basic goods from other countries. The
remaining revenue is used for Kuwaiti war reparations and to cover U.N.
administrative costs. Iraqi oil earnings are kept in a U.N. bank account in New
York and cannot be spent without the approval of the U.N. Sanctions Committee,
which evaluates Iraqi proposals for import contracts, submitted every six
months. If these are deemed legitimate, funds are released.
Critics of sanctions say that holds at the United
Nations have prohibited Iraqis from obtaining vital commodities such as blood
bags. Rubin says the problem lies entirely with Baghdad. Most of the
revenue from the Oil for Food program has not been spent by the Iraqi
government, says Rubin.
Contesting U.N. reports linking Iraqi suffering to sanctions,
Rubin admits there is a humanitarian crisis in southern and central Iraq. The
solution, however, is not to remove or alleviate sanctions but to bypass
Baghdad and let the United Nations deal with the distribution of goods.
Right now, under Oil for Food, Baghdad has to order the medicine. Let the
United Nations buy the medication, instead.
But economics professor Colin Rowat argues against attributing
North-South differences in Iraq to a single factor. Monocausal
explanations that blame Saddam Hussein for the whole difference between
the two regions, Rowat says, are simplistic.
Rowat who received his doctorate from Cambridge University,
England, is a former member of the universitys Campaign Against Sanctions
in Iraq. He visited southern and central Iraq for two weeks last December but
did not travel in the North. I think that one can recognize the benefits
that have accrued to Iraqi Kurdistan this past decade and one can seek their
continuance without oversimplifying the issues.
There are a number of factors, says Rowat, that
distinguish the Oil for Food program in the two regions. They include
agricultural differences -- northern Iraq has always been the agricultural
heartland of the country -- and differences in funding. The North receives 22
percent more per capita from the Oil for Food program and about 10 percent of
all U.N.-controlled assistance in currency while the rest of the country
receives only commodities.
The lack of a cash component in southern and central Iraq
cannot be underestimated, says Rowat, who cites recent U.N. reports
urging the Security Council and the Iraqi government to come up with a
mechanism for providing one.
Unless civil services can be paid -- something that may
require a cash component -- doctors, teachers, nurses, engineers, et cetera
will not be able to work properly in Iraq, he said.
Iraqs current problems, he adds, have more to do with
the state of the civilian infrastructure and the capacity of the civil service
than the distribution and supply of goods. The countrys transport
and communication systems have collapsed, and the electrical sector,
which was badly targeted during the war, remains in ill repair.
This has downstream consequences, he says.
Without electricity, you cant operate pumps, which means you
cant sanitize water.
Rubin says investment in Iraq is a good idea in theory, but
wonders how you could get the dollars into civil society. Most big
business is carried out by political leaders. What are you going to do if
confiscation of property occurs?
Rubin offers several proposals for dealing with Husseins
regime: 1) Set up a Commission of Experts -- the second step in the
establishment of a war crimes tribunal -- to determine if there is enough
evidence to indict Hussein. Rubins time in the North familiarized him
with Husseins persecution of the Kurds, and he is confident that many
would come forward to press charges. 2) Retain sanctions in the South, under
U.N. administration but lift sanctions for the people in the North who
have fulfilled their obligations. And lift the arms embargo for
them as well. 3) Bolster no-fly zones to include no-drive zones, similar
to what we did in Kosovo.
Prohibition of tank movement would be enforced from the air, says
Rubin, so there would be no commitment of American ground
troops.
If the people above, meaning Kurds in the North,
or below, meaning Shias in the South, want an uprising,
fine, says Rubin. Why shouldnt we let the Iraqi people
express themselves? What the people of Iraq want, Rubin later adds,
is a free and democratic Iraq and he believes they would support
any political leader the Americans wanted. He finds it strange that we in
America would prevent the Iraqi people from taking up arms.
In the lexicon of Washington policymakers, Rubin is a proponent of
regime change -- a strategy backed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, a former member on the Board of
Advisers for the Washington Institute of Near East Policy. Regime change, as
defined by Rumsfeld, is a more militarily aggressive policy that
emphasizes increased support for the Iraqi opposition. It is overtly aimed at
overthrowing Saddam Hussein if not the Iraqi regime, says Washington
analyst Phyllis Bennis.
Rubins views are shared by other members of the Institute of
Near East Policy. The conservative think-tank that provides policy papers for
congressional representatives and members of the National Security Council has
long argued that the real problem in Iraq is Saddam Hussein. In an op-ed
article for The Washington Post, published Feb. 27, 2000, Michael
Eisenstadt, senior fellow at the institute, wrote, Only when Washington
ships weapons will Middle Easterners judge the U.S. to be serious about getting
rid of Saddam Hussein.
Within the Bush administration, the Iraq discussion has yielded
hotly contested debates between proponents of regime change and smart
sanctions. The latter, a policy endorsed by Secretary of State Colin
Powell, proposes alleviating some of the restrictions on economic sanctions and
is considered to be the more moderate position within the Bush
administration.
Because Powells proposal for smart sanctions failed to pass
the U.N. Security Council in late May, the hawks are pushing for a more
aggressive agenda of regime-change, says Eric Gustafson, executive
director of Education for Peace in Iraq. They are pushing it, he
adds, at the expense of other policies.
Everyone would love to see a regime change in Iraq,
says Gustafson. The question is, how will it come about? Michael Rubin is
arguing that democracy can come from 50,000 feet in the air. He needs to point
to an example where that has ever happened.
Gustafson, who favors the removal of economic sanctions and the
strengthening of Iraqi civil rights, says that ironically we have
strengthened the authority of Baghdad by imposing sanctions on the Iraqi
people. Fundamentally, the U.N. has to rely on the Iraqi government to
run the [Oil for Food] program. Its just way too large. The Iraqi people
are now dependent on that rationing system, which creates a new vehicle of
control. But what is the fundamental characteristic of a democracy? A
population that is not dependent on central power.
National Catholic Reporter, August 10,
2001
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