Cover
story Elites dig in, population grows, violence continues in
Colombia
By GARY McEOIN
I am no longer surprised by anything
I read or hear about Colombia. I have been observing it for more than 50 years,
and it all follows its own ghoulish logic. This is a country where one quickly
learns to live dangerously.
I first looked down on Bogotá, the capital, from the window
of a DC-3. Before boarding, we had been weighed -- not just our bags but
ourselves. The weight-to-power ratio was critical. We were testing the
DC-3s ability to clear the mountain. The pilot had an oxygen mask. The
rest of us held our breath. The year was 1946.
Within days of our safe landing, the Colombian Senate in formal
session declared me an honorary citizen of Colombia, along with several dozen
other journalists. We were participants in a meeting of the Inter-American
Press Association. It was a perfect example of how the oligarchy has
traditionally run the country. We were wined and dined at luxurious country
clubs. They hoped we would write when we went back home about the modern cities
and the booming coffee economy, ignoring the expanding slums and the misery in
which the coffee workers lived -- and especially la violencia.
We wrote little at that time about la violencia, the
pathological condition that causes Colombians to kill each other savagely and
for no obvious reason. It had begun sporadically more than a decade earlier.
Today it is institutionalized. Of course it is not irrational. It is a gut
response to a social system that has for centuries concentrated power and
wealth in a small ruling class, while leaving the mass of citizens not only in
poverty, but without recourse against the capricious impositions of the
patrón.
While in recent decades, drugs and drug lords constitute a new
aggravating factor, they did not create the tragedy of Colombia. Get rid of
drugs, and the essential issues remain unsolved.
Population explosion in the 20th century without corresponding
economic growth made Colombias system unworkable. There were fewer than 4
million people in 1900. In 1950 there were 11 million (today, 40 million).
Unable to divide the tiny family plot any further, many young peasants chose to
climb higher in the mountains to join bands of desperadoes. They could count on
a brief moment of local glory before falling to the bullets of the military.
The bandits would occupy a village or an isolated homestead, or ambush a bus.
Before fleeing with their loot, they would slaughter all inhabitants, mutilate
the bodies and chop off the heads.
The year after our meeting, la violencia reached
Bogotá. Jorge Gaitan, an advocate of reform with a wide following, was
assassinated in broad daylight. Onlookers seized the gunman and beat him to
death. It was never determined who was behind the killing. Long pent-up
resentments had, however, been released. An outburst of pillage and burning
swept the city for days and spread across the country -- El
Bogotazo.
In the decade that followed, la
violencia produced an estimated 200,000 victims. The oligarchs had a
solution. In 1958, a pact signed by the Conservative and Liberal leaders
spelled the end of the pseudo-democracy that had existed for a century and a
half. The two parties would rotate the presidency every four years. Each would
be equally represented in all branches of government and in the diplomatic
service. They could control, they hoped, the rate, scope and character of
change. As a bonus, they were eliminating the possibility of any other party
challenging their monopoly of power. What the people thought no longer
mattered.
I had an insiders view of what followed, because I had just
achieved the dubious distinction of becoming an honorary member of the
oligarchy. I had become the director of public relations for the National
Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia. With coffee the major source of the
countrys foreign exchange, the federation was the real source of power.
We were the government.
I was, of course, a small cog in this big machine. But I played a
part. I developed the philosophy that underlay the International Coffee
Agreement. It was a simple concept. The number of cents we got for a pound of
coffee was irrelevant. What was important was the number of pounds of coffee
needed to buy a tractor, what economists called the terms of trade. The poor
countries had to get a price for their raw materials that paid for the inputs
they needed if they were to modernize their economies.
Led by the United States, the major coffee consuming countries
signed the International Coffee Agreement at the United Nations. To help U.S.
coffee drinkers swallow the additional cost of their favorite drink, we
invented Juan Valdez. We found him in Hollywood, a Cuban actor. When we dressed
him up and gave him a mule, he looked like the Colombian campesino we
wanted to sell -- prosperous, happy, the beneficiary of the higher coffee
prices.
We didnt stop there. We grabbed the Alliance for Progress, a
program initiated by President Kennedy in March 1961. Colombia would become its
showcase. We recruited young men in Colombia to work with Peace Corps
volunteers. We called them promotores. They would develop grassroots
initiatives in the villages in which they would work with their U.S.
counterparts. The promotor would assemble the villagers to discuss what
were the perceived needs of the community. It might be a well, a school, a
bridge, whatever. No problem, said the Peace Corps guy. He could get the
materials. The people would volunteer the labor.
Not so fast, said the villagers. They knew the
protocol. We must first discuss this with Don Jaime. Don Jaime was
the local patrón, in all probability the local representative of
the Coffee Federation. Don Jaime listened. But why hadnt you told
me about this? If I had known, Id have taken care of it long ago. Leave
it to me. And Don Jaime paid for the well or the school. The traditional
patrón-peón relationship had been reaffirmed.
Within a few years it was clear that nothing had changed. During
the 1960s and into the 1970s, la violencia became institutionalized as
never before. Warlords set themselves up in autonomous regions. Kidnappings
became a common method of raising funds. The countryside was no longer safe for
the Peace Corps volunteers, and they were moved to desk jobs in government
offices.
I spoke several times to Orlando
Fals Borda, then dean of the faculty of sociology at the National University of
Colombia. His analysis of the Alliance for Progress was devastating. What
we actually did was to mortgage the country in order to save a ruling class
that was headed for disaster. It was already tottering when this stimulation
came along to enable it to gasp out a few more breaths, the same kind of
artificial breathing as that of a dying man who is fed oxygen, and equally
expensive. The sad part is that this ruling class will not have to pay the
mortgage it incurred. It will be paid, perhaps with the blood, certainly with
the sweat of our children and the working classes, the innocent people who
always in the last analysis pay for the broken plates.
In 1969, the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate looked
at the work of the alliance and concluded that it had fallen far short of its
economic and social goals. The committee insisted, nevertheless, that the
alliance had justified itself: It had achieved its basic objective, which was
political stability and maintenance of Colombias democratic
institutions.
Thirty years later, as I look at Colombias political
stability and democratic institutions, I shudder at such
naiveté. The politicians ignored Fals Borda and continued on their
traditional path. I, for my part -- I hope a little wiser -- tearlessly said
goodbye to the Coffee Federation.
Things have changed, but only for the worse. There were 19
kidnappings in 1982. Now kidnappings number in the thousands each year. The
annual number of violent deaths, adjusted to the size of the population
of the United States, is a quarter of a million. The war against the
guerrillas is only 15 percent of the total. According to Human Rights Watch,
the paramilitaries working with the tacit acquiescence or open support of
the Colombian military, carried out most of the 400 massacres in
1999.
Wars require money, and drug profits enable all three parties to
the Colombian war to buy ever more sophisticated weapons and maintain bigger
armies. Drugs came to Colombia because the insatiable demand in the United
States since the Vietnam War expanded the production of drugs from the
traditional sources of supply in Asia to South America. Colombia was ready and
willing. Social chaos provided the climate. It is a perfect match.
Will todays U.S. escalation of the war achieve its objective
of destroying the coca crops in Colombia? It is unlikely. And even if it does,
production will merely move across the border. Already drug-processing plants
are springing up on the Ecuadorian side of the border with Colombia.
Envision what Colombia will be like if all this continues. What
little industrial infrastructure now remains will have been reduced to rubble.
The vast areas under coca production will have been sprayed with glyphosate and
will lie infertile for generations. And what about the land mines and the
depleted uranium shells?
Will a U.S. Senate commission decide once again that our decisive
role in achieving this outcome has been justified, that we have brought
political stability and democratic institutions to Colombia?
Gary MacEoins Colombia and Venezuela and the Guianas
(Time Life Books, 1965, 1971) can be found in English and Spanish editions
in many public libraries. MacEoins e-mail address is
gmaceoin@cs.com
National Catholic Reporter, November 16,
2001
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