|
Cuba: Cold War pawn and sanctions target still
fascinates
By GARY MacEOIN
Havana
Cuba fascinates me. I first came here in 1945. Its news value then
was close to nil. It showed up once a year in the business section when we
learned how many millions of tons of sugar the harvest promised us. In the
following years it figured more prominently in scandal sheets as Las Vegas
gangsters built luxury hotels and casinos.
By my fifth visit in June 1958 it was firmly established as a
hedonists paradise, a haven for the playboy rich, a byword for
corruption, decadence and inequality.
Herbert Matthews of The New York Times reported that Havana
had 50,000 prostitutes and 270 brothels. When I got into a taxi in the late
1940s, the driver had enough broken English to offer me, with ample gestures,
his sister, 13 years old.
By that time, also, thanks to Matthews and a few other
enterprising journalists, many had heard about 32-year-old Fidel Castro who,
with the 12 survivors of a small invasion force, was waging a guerrilla war
since 1956 in the Sierra Maestra. On New Years Day 1959, abandoned by the
United States, Dictator Fulgencio Batista fled. We welcomed Castro, now a folk
hero, to the Overseas Press Club of New York, where we endured what soon became
his trademark, a three-hour impromptu speech.
Back in Cuba in June 1959 and again a year later, I watched the
different reactions of the wealthy and the impoverished as farms over 1,000
acres and foreign enterprises were nationalized, rents drastically cut, and
racial apartheid abolished. Those who, reading the signs, had salted away their
wealth in Florida, started what was soon a mass exodus to Miami. The United
States, at first benignly indifferent to what it assumed would simply be a
brief cleansing followed by a new round of corruption, bristled at the threat
to its $2 billion investment. As a few years earlier in Guatemala, it rejected
the proffered long-term bonds as inadequate, severed diplomatic relations,
imposed an embargo, and recruited, trained and equipped the army that ended up
ignominiously at the Bay of Pigs.
To survive, Castro turned to the Soviet Union. It responded
generously, buying the sugar and providing industrial equipment, technical aid
and liberal credit. Cuba now became a pawn in the Cold War, leading to the
threat of a nuclear holocaust in the 1962 Missile Crisis. After that was
resolved by Soviet withdrawal and a U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba, we
committed ourselves to a hysterical policy in which we persist to this day: Use
whatever means are necessary to force Cuba to recognize our suzerainty. The
CIA, as we all know, is creative. Exploding cigars, a poisoned wet suit, a
poisoned pen are a few of its more than a score of assassination attempts
identified by a congressional inquiry. The effort continues, even after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Radio and TV Marti. Saboteurs. Funds for
subversive groups.
What sense does it make? A small island with 11 million people. It
would fit six times into Texas with room to spare. No navy. A tiny army and air
force without offensive capacity. Is this a greater threat to our survival than
a communist tyranny like China with which we maintain diplomatic relations and
to which we award favored nation status?
Just as the United States is fascinated, so am I. That is why in
January 2002, I am back for the 12th or 13th time. A decade after the collapse
of the Soviets, how high is the morale? Do people here still support the
regime, or are they ready to cry uncle?
Some things are better
Some things are definitely better than half a century ago. People
are taller. They have better teeth. They live longer. Both children and adults
are in better physical shape. Obesity is rare. The typical Latin American
division between a few ultra wealthy and many in abject poverty has
disappeared. Income disparity is about one to three, a radical contrast to the
United States where it is one to 100, or more.
Some things have worsened. Apart from a few major streets, the
roads are potholed. Vintage automobiles, although meticulously polished and
carefully maintained, need shocks. Stores and homes cry out for a coat of
paint. Clothes are of inferior quality. Clothing, transport and medicines are
in short supply, as are such basic food items as meat, milk, eggs and
butter.
Some things are unchanged. Fresh breezes off the ocean provide a
pleasant alternative to the smog that substitutes for air in most cities today.
You hear a chorus of Mira (look), Oye
(listen), Psst, as people greet acquaintances on crowded streets.
They shout to each other. I think they must all be deaf from day-and-night-long
immersion in a cacophony of competing loudspeakers spewing salsa music and
vapid oratory at full blast. For once I am grateful that I can remove my
hearing aids.
There are reasons for the changes. People are taller and have
better teeth because of the universal availability of free medical and dental
services combined with training at school in good dietary practices. These
advances explain why Cubans live as long as people in the United States (79
years for women, 74 for men), and why the median age is 35 years, compared with
20 in El Salvador and other neighboring countries. An additional reason is that
Cubans, unlike other Third World peoples, do not need children in order to have
a caregiver in old age. Everyone has a guaranteed pension. So with access to
effective reproductive services, they limit family size.
The health indices take Cuba out of the Third World category.
Infant mortality, for example, is seven per thousand live births, 7.6 in the
United States. For Argentina, it is 18; for Latin America and the Caribbean as
a whole, 30. Universal health care takes 9.1 percent of the gross domestic
product, same as in Canada.
Supporters of the regime as well as critics speak of the
devastating impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, a catastrophe
that revealed the Cuban regimes surprising capacity for survival. Cuba,
unlike the East European satellites on whom socialism was imposed by tanks and
bayonets, is the product of a popular revolution, and the aggressive hostility
of the United States has served to further strengthen its nationalistic
backbone.
Also helpful were the social benefits, the high-quality universal
free medicine and an education system that has produced an average of nine
years of schooling. Finally, the media kept the people fully informed of what
happened to the Soviet satellites when the empire collapsed. A violent change,
the people believed, would reduce them to the economic level of Haiti or
Nicaragua.
This does not mean that the Soviet collapse had no impact. Giulio
Girardi, an expert at Vatican II and a strong supporter of the Cuban system,
says the ideological impact, while less than the economic, raised doubts
about the system of certainties that underlay the political options of Cubans,
first of all, the conviction of the superiority of socialism over
capitalism.
Trade with the Soviet bloc, representing 85 percent of total
trade, had been conducted on preferential terms. The gross domestic product
fell 40 percent in three years, with a comparable increase in the indicators of
corruption, prostitution, emigration and social upheaval.
The black market grows
Centralized planning, with the state employing 95 percent of the
work force, blocked a rise in productivity that might have compensated for the
drastic decline in trade. Key reforms were, however, quickly introduced. State
farms, 80 percent of all arable land, became cooperatives whose members were
paid on the basis of productivity. Markets for agricultural produce and for
service and artisan work were legalized, as was possession of U.S. dollars. The
black market, a constant in Cuban life, has grown.
The content of exports changed radically. Previously sugar was the
motor of the economy with close to 10 million tons exported annually, all to
the Soviet bloc. Sugar is profitable only when the producer has a guaranteed
market at preferential rates. Having no longer such a market, Cuba has cut
production to 3 million tons. Nickel, an industry developed with Soviet aid, is
doing much better. A 1994 deal with Sherrit, a Canadian firm, has increased
exports from 29,000 tons to about 70,000.
Juan Váldez Paz, an economist close to the regime, told me
that the macro economy by the end of the 1990s had recovered to 75 percent of
the 1989 level, and will recover fully by 2003. A third of trade is now with
Europe, a third with Latin America, and a third with the rest of the world.
Diplomatic relations have expanded proportionately. In 1970, Mexico was the
only Latin American or Caribbean country that had diplomatic relations with
Cuba; now, all do except El Salvador. The recovery, however, is still
inadequately reflected in nourishment, clothing, transport and medicine.
Cuba has a pharmaceutical industry, but allocation of the product
has been transferred from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of External
Trade. Most of the substantial production, including state-of-the-market drugs
created and patented by Cubans, is exported, leaving shortages at home. In
addition, many drugs produced only in the United States, including the best
treatments for AIDS, are excluded by the embargo.
The minimum wage of 125 pesos a month (about $5), together with
free or almost free housing, enables everyone to survive just above starvation
level. Professionals earning three or four times the minimum do only marginally
better. To live comfortably, one needs dollars obtained from family members
abroad or through working in tourism. So professionals take jobs as waiters and
bartenders, or use their cars as taxis. Dollars are needed not only to buy
gasoline, but for such essentials as clothing and many medicines.
Tourism brings with it prostitution, as it did in pre-Castro Cuba.
The trade today is less open but growing. It troubles the guardians of
socialist orthodoxy, as do the concomitant drug abuse and sexual diseases.
The number of hotel rooms is up in a decade from 2,000 to 30,000.
Tourists come from Latin America, Canada and Western Europe. A small but
growing number come from the United States through a third country in defiance
of Treasury regulations that make it a crime to spend dollars in Cuba.
(Journalists and researchers are exempt.)
Resistance is growing in the United States to the ban on travel, a
ban many consider unconstitutional as an arbitrary restriction on citizen
rights. Pressure is also coming from U.S. commercial interests. Last December
food conglomerates and farmers forced approval of a $30 million sale of food.
While I was in Havana a delegation of farmers, including several members of
Congress, was in Cuba exploring further trade possibilities. Sen. Arlen
Specter, R-Pa., told the press that we must reestablish diplomatic relations
for active Cuban cooperation in the wars against terrorism and drugs.
Specter was echoing Rep. William D. Delahunt, D-Mass., who the
previous month had said it is time to lift the travel ban. As Cuba receives
more and more investment from Canada, Mexico, Spain, England, France and
Germany, U.S. industry fears that it is losing a market that once was its third
most important in the world.
Wayne Smith, whom I ran into in Havana where he was leading a
group of students from Johns Hopkins University, told me he expects the ban to
go within 12 months. Smith follows Cuban affairs closely. He had worked at the
U.S. Embassy in Havana before Castro came to power, and he returned later as
Chief of Mission at what became known as the U.S. Interest Section. In 1982 he
resigned from the Foreign Service because U.S. administrations simply are
unable to deal rationally with Cuba.
Castro has been reaching out for better relations. In addition to
the food purchases, he has withheld criticism of the use of the Guantanamo Bay
base to house captives and has offered increased cooperation on drug
trafficking and fighting terrorism. Bush appointees hostile to Cuba led by Otto
Reich, a Cuban exile who is the State Departments top policymaker for
Latin America, have so far prevented any softening of policy.
Tightly controlled, incredibly
dull
All Cuban domestic media of social communications, written and
electronic, are tightly controlled, and all are incredibly dull. The hostile
radio and TV transmissions from Radio Marti and other Florida stations are
jammed. CNNs satellite programs are not jammed. Few, however, have
dishes, other than the big hotels. Some official publications, notably the
quarterly Temas, are of high quality and contain considerable criticism,
always without questioning the systems socialist underpinnings.
Channels for criticism or dissent are few. People use the churches
to express grievances, especially the Catholic church, which serves for many as
an escape or refuge. The Protestant churches, which had benefited by the ending
of the Catholic churchs privileged position, were long close to the
regime. Today they are more critical. Church publications, which are not
controlled, are well produced, with professional content and a wide range of
views.
Small groups, political parties, human rights activists and
journalists express their views in semi-clandestine leaflets. Some telephone
statements to radio stations in Florida to be beamed back to Cuba.
These stations regularly broadcast claims that Cubas jails
contained thousands of political prisoners. No statistics are available.
However, Human Rights Watch, an impartial observer, insists that Cuba still
imprisons dissidents and denies them access to international human rights
monitors.
After considerable discussion, Wayne Smith and I reached agreement
on three reasons why Castro maintains the lock on the media. He is a
gallego, son of an immigrant from an area in northwest Spain whose
people are reputedly as stubborn as Missouri mules. He is a
patrón. In Latin America the patrón makes all
decisions. The peon tips his sombrero and says Sí,
señor. And finally, Castro is a product of Jesuit
education.
How has the Catholic church survived the revolution? Very well,
according to both priests and laypeople. This, however, needs to be kept in
perspective. In the 1930s, although 90 percent of Cubans were baptized,
attendance at Sunday Mass was between 2 and 3 percent. Now, fewer than 40
percent are baptized, and attendance still hovers between 2 and 3 percent.
The countrys 11 bishops, when they thought in 1993 that the
regime was about to collapse, published a very critical document. Later,
particularly about the time of Pope John Paul IIs 1998 visit, they
softened their statements, though without changing their basic attitude.
At the time of the visit some, particularly in the United States,
anticipated a destabilizing effect similar to the visit to Poland that many
regard as the catalyst of the Soviet Empires collapse. In fact, Castro
gained considerably from the visit. During the visit, the pope denounced the
oppressive economic measures -- unjust and ethically unacceptable --
imposed from outside the country. He called for an end to the U.S.
embargo on food and medicines.
No significant change, however, occurred in the mindset of Cuban
Catholics. As the pastor of a Havana church told me, the overwhelming majority
continue to long for a return to the church of the 1930s and 40s. The
mentality is completely pre-Vatican II. They promote Catholic trade unions and
such other parallel organizations as Catholic Action and Catholic Youth. These
organizations operate freely but have few members and carry little weight.
More than 40 years have passed since Fidel Castro put a U.S.
gambling and prostitution backwater on the world map. The world media continue
to track his movements and his statements. David Rockefeller, Jack Nicholson
and Ted Turner are among the celebrities and power brokers he entertains at
3-hour banquets. He has survived several CIA-instigated assassination attempts.
Now 75, he recently showed his mortality by collapsing during one of his
interminable orations. But like Pope John Paul II, who is seven years his
senior, he shows no sign of retiring. And his socialist experiment keeps moving
along year after year.
Religion in
statistics |
Before Castro, Cubas 11 dioceses had 639 priests for
a population of 5 million. Many priests left or were expelled in the early
1960s, reducing the number to some 200. Now there are 400 priests for a
population of 11 million, 60 churches, 500 legally registered house
churches and more than 1,200 not registered. Sixty percent of the priests
are foreigners, from 24 countries. About 60 students study in the major
seminary in Havana, and 30 in the minor seminary in Santiago de Cuba. There are
21 orders of men and 50 of women, and more than 30 Catholic publications, 20 of
which are members of a union affiliated to the International Catholic Union of
the Press.
Protestant churches number 900, with 1,000 pastors. There are
three Protestant delegates in the National Assembly, two of them pastors widely
known in the United States and Canada: Sergio Arce and Raúl
Suárez. There are 5 synagogues. |
Gary MacEoin first visited Cuba in 1945 as a delegate from
Trinidad to a symposium on the church in Latin America at the Jesuit Colegio de
Belén (where Fidel Castro was then a student). MacEoin has returned more
than a dozen times. His e-mail address is gmaceoin@cs.com
National Catholic Reporter, March 8,
2002
|
|